Economic Security First: How Global Technology Competition Is Reshaping the Rules of Great Power Rivalry

The Era of Economic Security First

In Washington policy circles, a word is replacing "globalization" as the new mantra: economic security. It is no longer merely a matter of trade balance or financial stability, but the key to the success or failure of great-power competition. In November 2025, the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) bipartisan special task force released a report, "U.S. Economic Security," which, with a rare systematic perspective, depicted America's anxiety that its "advantages are being eroded" in three frontier fields: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology.

The value of this report lies not in enumerating new threats, but in clearly demonstrating the end of the old model. For a long time, the United States and other developed countries assumed that as long as they maintained the innovation frontier, the outflow of manufacturing was harmless. But the hidden dangers of large-scale supply chain outsourcing were fully exposed under the triple impact of the pandemic, geopolitical conflict, and technological nationalism. Today, economic logic and security logic have formally converged.

The Sliced-Open "Globalization" Skin

The report used a set of data to reveal the depth of U.S. dependence on China: 70% of rare earth supply depends on China, and heavy rare earths 99%; 30% of printed circuit boards come from China, and 60% of related chemicals rely on imports; 80% of key starting materials for biotechnology come from China, one-third of global API production capacity is concentrated in China, and 80% of U.S. biotechnology companies maintain at least one contract with China. In the field of quantum computing, key equipment even depends on a single supplier.

The structural problem behind these numbers is: the United States excels at breakthroughs from 0 to 1, but has lost the manufacturing capability from 1 to N. When technology begins to move toward large-scale application, supply chain bottlenecks become strategic bottlenecks. The rational choices made by enterprises in pursuit of efficiency accumulate into an irrational vulnerability of national security. This is a typical fallacy of composition.

Capital Votes with Its Feet

Even more worrying is that the market itself is aggravating the problem. The report points out that private capital is moving away from quantum computing and biotechnology because of overly long return cycles, unclear commercialization paths, and difficulty in scaling. In the first half of 2025, early-stage financing for U.S. biotechnology startups plummeted by 65%. At the same time, China has invested approximately $900 billion in the three major fields over the past decade, with annual spending on quantum technology roughly twice that of the United States.

Capital is not unaware of great-power competition; it simply cannot withstand R&D and profit cycles lasting more than a decade. This precisely constitutes a reasonable justification for state intervention. The report emphasizes that market failure is the prerequisite for state intervention, and the current biggest failure is precisely the investment shortage in strategic fields and the excessive concentration of supply chains.

The Redesign of a National Innovation SystemThe recommendations put forward in the report are, in essence, a redesign of the U.S. national innovation system. For example, using Department of Defense procurement to push the world's first utility-scale quantum computer effectively replicates the government's "first customer" role in the aerospace and semiconductor industries during the Cold War; establishing a network of biomanufacturing centers and funding companies to stockpile six months' worth of active pharmaceutical ingredients uses public funds to hedge market risks; expanding national reserves of critical minerals and mapping resource distribution together with allies shows that resource security has returned to the strategic agenda.

An even more nuanced part lies in its reflection on government capacity. The report recommends establishing a standing "Economic Security Center" in the Department of Commerce to integrate technology experts, intelligence officials, and private-sector talent. Behind this proposal is an underappreciated fact: the United States' existing export control and supply chain monitoring system lacks sufficient technical expertise and cross-agency coordination capacity. If bureaucratic institutions continue to be used to cope with the technology race, even the most correct policies will not be executable.

Equally noteworthy is that the report does not neglect the labor issue. It specifically proposes supporting skilled workers such as electricians and machinists, because technological leadership depends not only on scientists in laboratories, but also on the backbone workforce capable of building chip plants, power grids, and manufacturing facilities. This is a pragmatic dimension often overlooked in the high-tech innovation narrative.

Security Logic Reshaping the Global Order

Placing this report in a global context, it is itself a signal of the times. Not only the United States, but also the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and India are advancing similar economic security agendas. Export controls, investment reviews, and localization subsidies are becoming the new normal. Global supply chains are no longer configured for "optimal efficiency," but rather as political arrangements with "controllable risks."

The impact of this shift is profound. For multinational corporations, old assumptions about global operations are being upended; for developing countries, they face pressure to choose sides between the U.S. and Chinese systems, yet may also exploit great-power competition to gain more autonomy; for the international rules-based system, the dominant position of trade liberalization is giving way to frequent invocation of national security exception clauses.

The report does not advocate closure. It repeatedly emphasizes balancing security and prosperity, and advises policymakers to carefully define the boundaries of intervention. But whether this balance can be achieved depends on the specific trajectory of great-power interactions in the coming years. What is certain is that the old globalization will not fully return. The new economic order will be dominated by security logic, and the decisive factor in this race lies in who can rebuild reliable manufacturing and supply capabilities while maintaining innovative vitality.

The Race Has No EndgameTechnological competition has never been one-directional. The report acknowledges that the United States cannot achieve self-sufficiency in every aspect, nor can it completely sever its ties with the global market. The real challenge lies in defining the boundaries of "selective dependence" — which requires sustained strategic judgment and institutional innovation. As AI further permeates military and civilian domains, quantum computing breaks through the ceiling of classical computing power, and biotechnology reshapes healthcare and agriculture, the international system over the next decade will revolve even more tightly around technological capability. Economic security is no longer a contingency measure, but a long-term way of survival.